Trajectory
From the representational to the performative idiom
Something is shifting in how we understand what knowledge is and what it does. For much of the modern period, the dominant assumption has been that knowledge represents — that it stands apart from the world and offers a picture of it, more or less accurate, more or less complete. The scientist, the researcher, the analyst steps back, observes, measures, and produces a representation of what is there. Knowledge, on this account, is a mirror held up to reality.
This is what might be called the representational idiom. It is not simply a philosophical position — it is a whole way of organizing inquiry, institutions, and the relationship between knowing and acting. It assumes that the knower can and should separate themselves from what they are studying. It assumes that the most reliable knowledge is the most context-free — the kind that could have been produced anywhere, by anyone, from no particular position in the world. And it assumes that knowledge and the world it describes are fundamentally separate things: first you know, then you act.
The trajectory being traced here is a movement away from that idiom and toward something different — something that might be called the performative idiom. The shift is not simply methodological. It reaches into the deepest assumptions about what knowledge is, what it is for, and what it means to be a knower in the world.
What the performative idiom proposes
The core insight of the performative idiom is that knowledge does not merely describe a pre-given world — it participates in bringing worlds forth. This is not idealism, and it does not mean that anything goes or that reality is simply constructed by whoever is doing the constructing. It means something more precise and more interesting: that the practices, instruments, concepts, and forms through which we inquire are not neutral windows onto an independent reality but active participants in shaping what becomes visible, what becomes possible, and what counts as real.
The philosopher of science Andrew Pickering offers one of the clearest accounts of this. In his work on the mangle of practice, Pickering describes scientific knowledge not as the gradual accumulation of representations of a fixed world but as the outcome of a dynamic, open-ended dance between human and nonhuman agency — between the intentions and projects of scientists and the resistances and accommodations of the material world. Knowledge, on this account, is always the product of a specific practice, a specific encounter, a specific moment of tuning between what humans want to do and what the world will allow. It is performative in the sense that it does something — it intervenes, it shapes, it produces effects — rather than simply reflecting what was already there.
This has been developed in different directions by different thinkers. In feminist science studies, Donna Haraway's notion of situated knowledge argues that all knowledge is produced from somewhere — from a particular body, a particular location, a particular set of relationships and concerns — and that the pretense of a view from nowhere is not objectivity but a kind of epistemic evasion. Karen Barad's agential realism takes this further, arguing that the separation between the observer and the observed is itself produced through specific material-discursive practices — what she calls intra-actions — rather than being a given feature of reality. And in the social sciences, thinkers from Judith Butler to Michel Callon have explored how knowledge about social life does not simply describe social reality but actively performs it — calling into being the subjects, markets, identities, and institutions it purports to merely observe.
Why this trajectory matters
The movement from the representational to the performative idiom is not just an academic development. It has consequences for how we understand research, education, politics, and everyday life.
If knowledge is performative — if it participates in bringing forth the worlds it describes — then the question of what knowledge we produce, and how we produce it, becomes an ethical and political question as much as an epistemological one. It is not enough to ask whether our representations are accurate. We have to ask what worlds our practices of knowing are helping to bring into being, and whether those are the worlds we actually want.
This reframing opens up space for very different kinds of inquiry. Research that is openly situated and relational rather than pretending to detachment. Knowledge production that is participatory — that works with and through the communities and contexts it is engaging rather than extracting data from them. Forms of inquiry that are themselves experiments in living differently, rather than studies conducted at a safe distance from the questions they raise.
It also connects to something deeper: a different relationship between knowing and being. If what we know is inseparable from how we practice inquiry, and if those practices are inseparable from how we live, then the question of knowledge cannot be cleanly separated from the question of livelihoods — from the question of what kinds of lives we are living and what kinds of worlds we are, through that living, helping to bring forth.
Where this trajectory is moving
The performative idiom is not yet a settled or institutionalized form. It exists in fragments — in certain research traditions, certain artistic practices, certain communities of inquiry that have begun to work differently. It is a trajectory precisely because it is in motion: a movement from one way of organizing knowledge toward another that is not yet fully formed.
What it points toward is a kind of inquiry that is more honest about its own situatedness, more attentive to the worlds it is participating in bringing forth, and more willing to take seriously the entanglement of knowing, doing, and living. An inquiry that does not stand apart from the questions it asks but moves within them — that is itself a form of wayfaring rather than a view from above.
This is one of the trajectories re-rooting is most directly engaged with. The website itself is an experiment in performative inquiry — a practice of bringing forth a particular kind of attention and a particular set of questions, in the hope that doing so helps make a different way of moving through the world a little more possible.
Related vocabulary
Voice & Vocality — terms that gather around the shift from representation to performance.
If anything strikes you about this, or there is anything you would like to add, please let us know.